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1 Introduction
In several countries, healthcare services are provided by public and/or private subjects, and they are
reimbursed by the Government. Typically, the reimbursement mechanism is based on a prospective
per case payment system, with the ultimate goal of leading providers to compete on quality, in order to
attract consumers/patients, and to increase the average quality of offered services. In the specific case
of hospital services, for instance, the payment system is based on DRG (Diagnosis Related Group)
mechanism, firstly introduced in the US in 1983, and currently adopted in most European countries
(Busse et al. 2011). According to the DRG system, each specific diagnosis treatment is associated to
a specific price. This means that healthcare providers are reimbursed a fixed tariff for each patient
treated, according to DRG classifications. Thus, providers take price as given, and the competition
to attract patients is mainly based on quality.
Not surprisingly, the design of the reimbursement mechanism differs across countries. Differences
mainly concern the extent of the use of the DRG system to finance hospital care (the system can hold
only for a subset of healthcare services), and the size of the specific reimbursement associated to each
DRG. Within a given country, differences can occur across the prices paid to different providers: in
some countries, the same DRG treatment can be reimbursed allocating different prices to different
provider types; this can be justified on the basis of some institutional specificity of providers, or
differences in other aspects of the overall financial transfer to providers.
It is more surprising that, in several countries, the payment design also differs across the regions. In
Italy, for instance, the reimburse mechanisms, and the price levels for the same treatment, significantly
differ across regions: more specifically there are “national tariffs” for each DRG, but the Regions, that
have the institutional duty of supervising the health care provision, can decide –and have decided
indeed– to reimburse their hospitals according to different prices. The same holds for Spanish regions
and autonomous communities, or in Sweden, just to mention a few countries.
The theoretical literature concerning the adoption of per-case payment (rather than simple cost
reimbursement) in health economics is large and well-established. We can mention the seminal contri-
butions of Ellis and McGuire (1986), Ma (1994), Street (2011), among others. This research stream
shows that hospital payment schemes based on full reimbursement of the incurred costs lead to a
“medical arms race” among hospitals and, thus, to an escalation of health care costs (Cavalieri et al.
2016); a prospective per case reimbursement system seems to be appropriate, to lead hospitals to more
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efficient choices.
There is also a wide body of empirical literature concerning the determinants and the effects of
DRG prices (see. e.g., various chapters in Culyer and Newhouse 2000, and Pauly et al, 2011; see
also Mikkala et al., 2002, and Schreyoegg et al, 2006). The determinants of price levels typically
include the estimated cost, taking into consideration different components, with a different weight
of past history and prospective evolution, according to different countries. It goes without saying
that different reimbursement schemes imply different incentives for health care providers. Just to give
some intuitive examples, if providers were paid by a fixed price for every treatment, they would be
expected to cream-skim patients by selecting the more lucrative cases. A re-payment system based
on DRG should limit (though not completely overcome) this obvious problem (Ellis and Miller 2008;
Cavalieri et al. 2016). The fixed price per each DRG treatment should induce the providers to reduce
the average length of stay, in order to reduce inpatient costs and increase profit margins; to reduce
unnecessary medical procedures for each patient treated, and so on. However, the effectiveness of this
mechanism rests on the specific way in which prices are set.
The body of theoretical investigation concerning price design is more restricted. In particular, to
the best of our knowledge, interaction of price regulation between regions within a given country, is
an aspect which is overlooked by available literature, even if relevant contributions are available as
far as the difference in quality levels of service across regions are concerned (Brekke et al. 2014, 2016;
Aiura, 2016).
It is well-known that regional differences in the provision and utilization of healthcare service
(and hospital services) may be relevant, due to both demand and supply side factors. Skinner (2011)
provides an excellent overview: regional differences in demographic structure, consumers/patients’
preferences or income, health status, price levels and dynamics drive to different demand functions;
heterogeneity in factor endowments, public budget choices, and other institutional characteristics may
drive to different supply functions. It has been suggested, and empirically shown, that the different
payment mechanisms across regions impact on the composition of hospital care supply side across
regions, e.g., in terms of public-private mix, condition of private and public subjects, and the degree
of competition in the health care market (Cavalieri et al. 2013). The payment design (and the
DRG specifically) affects the efficiency of providers (Busse et al. 2011; Moreno and Wagstaff, 2010);
moreover, it affects the high technology equipment choices, and technology diffusion (Bech et al.
2009, Bokhari 2009; Finocchiaro Castro et al. 2014; Levaggi et al. 2012, 2014). Hence, different
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reimbursement mechanisms have an impact on patients’ satisfaction.
It is worth underlying that, if patients are free to choose the healthcare provider, expected satis-
faction drives individual choices about the provider, and patient mobility has to be expected. Patient
mobility –both across the regions of any given country, and even across countries– is a widely observed
phenomenon indeed (see, e.g., Rosenmoller et al. 2004; Balia et al. 2014); the phenomenon is expected
to increase in next future, at least in the EU in front of recent Directives.1 This mobility, per se, is
not a negative by-product of the system; it associates with the aim of stimulating competition and
increasing quality. However, the mobility entails social and monetary costs, and has welfare implica-
tion. Reasoning by backward induction, it is clear that the regional price-setter, while fixing the price,
has to take into account the reaction of health providers, and, in turn, patient choices. Moreover, it
is clear that the choice of each regional regulator affects the outcome for all hospitals and regions.
Here, we propose a simple sequential game to describe the relevant interdependence links that
are in operation in a similar framework, with the final aim to investigate the individual and social
welfare implications of different institutional rules. For instance, our model permits to evaluate pros
and cons of the introduction of national coordination, or national fixing of DRG prices, as compared
to regionally decentralized regulation. In our model we will assume that regional authorities aim to
maximise the regional social welfare, and we will overlook a potentially large set of considerations
concerning the real goals of policy-makers and regional regulators in this sector. In any case, if
consumers/patients are free to choose the provider to patronize, then inter-regional mobility occurs,
with relevant effects for regional social welfare. Though specific to the health sector, our theoretical
model may be of interest for industrial economics in general, provided that competition among different
regional regulators occurs in several sectors (education, long term care, transportation, and so on) and
in several countries. In all these cases, consumers, providers and regional Authorities are characterised
by different objective functions, and related by similar strategic interdependence links. Inter-regional
competion across providers, mainly based on product quality, and consumers’ mobility are the rule.
Two specific available articles are very close to our present investigation, namely Brekke et al.
(2014, 2016). In the former, differentiated levels of skills, and hence differences in “potential” quality
levels across regions are considered, and the point under investigation is whether or not patient mobility
is desirable from a welfare perspective. The article employs a Hotelling spatial competition model and
1E.g., Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament; Brekke et al (2016), among others, provide further references
to norms entailing a higher expected mobility.
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shows that consumer (patient) mobility enhances the quality of offered service in “high skill” regions
and improves the number of treated patients there, but such an outcome depends on the payment
mechanism: price has to exceed marginal cost; otherwise, a “race to the bottom” occurs, with lower
welfare levels in all regions. In general, the effects of different transfer mechanisms to pay the region
attracting extra-regional demand are studied: welfare implications and the ability of different rules to
lead to Pareto improvements are investigated. However, there is no room to deal with a price setting
problem, since both firm (hospital) and regional policy-maker consider quality as the choice variable.
In the latter (Brekke et al. 2016) the spatial competition model considers a Salop circle, where
three regions exist, characterised by different income levels: regional policy makers choose quality to
maximise the utility of its own residents and the total cost of health services is financed by general
income taxation, in the presence of budget constraint. The model studies the implications of consumer
mobility upon quality choice and public expenditure, the welfare effects of change in monetary and
non-monetary costs of mobility, and the effects of income distribution, within and across regions,
upon equilibrium allocation, i.e., quantity and quality of regional services. Also in this model there is
no distinction between provider and regional policy-maker, and the game is not sequential: regional
policy makers set by themselves the quality of the service offered in each region; therefore, hospitals
are not considered as autonomous subjects.
We propose here a theoretical model with a focus on the effects of interaction among regional regu-
lators as price-setters. We spend attention in articulating the objectives of providers and in modelling
their interaction with patients, on the one side, and policy-makers on the other side. Moreover, our
present model allows to analyse spatial competition among providers as articulated in intra-regional
and inter-regional competition. Three different classes of subjects are relevant in our model: (1) the
patients, who choose the provider (i.e., the hospital) to patronize, within or outside the region where
they live; (2) the healthcare providers, which are profit-oriented, face given price (set by the regional
policy-maker), compete on quality to attract patients, in front of a spatial monopoly position which
is weakened by costly patient mobility; (3) the regional authorities, i.e., price-setters, that fix the
price, ideally taking care of the regional welfare, and are aware that interdependence links with other
regional price-setters exist. The value added of our present model, with respect of the two specific
articles mentione above, rests on the clear distinction between regulator and provider: this distintion
has a relevant counterpart in the real world, where the decision chain is well structured, and the links
and reciprocal influences between providers and regulators play a relevant role.
5
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 presents the basic set-up of the model, introduc-
ing the characteristics of demand and supply side, and the characteristics of the game under scrutiny.
Section 3 provides the equilibrium of the game. Section 4 depicts the equilibrium outcome under the
assumption of centralised decision concerning DRG prices. Section 5 draws the policy implications of
our game theoretical model. Section 6 mentions possible extensions, including the discussion about
the effect of quadratic (rather than linear) production cost assumption. Section 7 provides concluding
comments.
2 The model set-up
We propose a model to study quality competition between hospitals, taking into due account that
prices are set by a regulator at regional level. The competition between hospitals occurs both in the
same region and outside the region, under different regulation rules. For this purpose, we consider
a two stage non-cooperative game with complete information, with prices that are fixed by different
regional authorities. Our model differs from the existing literature in which Brekke et al. (2011)
consider the case of an unique price and Ma and Burgess (1993) study a model with different prices
that are fixed by the hospitals and are paid by the patients. Unlike in Brekke et al. (2012, 2014), in
our model hospitals are profit-seeking and autonomous subjects with respect to the regional regulator.
In our model, at the first stage the regions fix the DRG prices to be paid in; then, at the second
stage, the hospitals -taken the prices as given- choose the quality levels of their services, which in turn
determine the demand, with possible mobility of patients across regions. The market is fully covered:
each patient demands one unit of service, and can choose the provider to patronize, within or outside
the region where (s)he lives. The price is paid by the Government, which attaches an opportunity
cost to such public expenditure. Thus, hospitals can compete on quality to attract patients.
As in Siciliani et al. (2013) and Brekke et al. (2016), we adopt a localization model a` la Salop
(1979)2 where the hospitals are exogenously and equally localized around a circle with circumference
equal to 1, so that the distance between any two neighbouring hospitals is equal to 1/n. The patients
are uniformly distributed along the circumference with total mass normalized at 1.
2See also Ishida and Matsishima (2004) and Hamoudi and Risueno (2012), inter alia, as examples of models employing
the circular city localization model in the presence of regulation policies.
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The utility of a consumer located at x and served by hospital H, located at zH , is given by
u (x, zH) = v + qH − τ |x− zH | , (1)
where v is the gross valuation of consumption, qH ≥ 0 is the quality offered by Provider H, and τ is
the marginal disutility of travelling. The assumption v > τ ensures that the market is fully covered.3
Each patient can only move to the two adjacent hospitals. The consumer who is indifferent between
hospital i and hospital i+ 1 is located at x̂i+1i , which, measured clockwise from hospital i, is given by
x̂i+1i =
1
2nH
+
qi − qi+1
2τ
. (2)
Similarly, the consumer indifferent between hospital i and i − 1 is located at x̂i−1i , which, measured
anticlockwise from hospital i, is given by
x̂i−1i =
1
2nH
+
qi − qi−1
2τ
. (3)
Thus, the demand function for each hospital i ∈ {1, . . . , nH} is:
xDi =
1
nH
+
qi − qi+1
2τ
+
qi − qi−1
2τ
. (4)
We propose to consider here the case of a country (the circle) with two regions (nR = 2) and
two hospitals in each region (nH = 2). Thus, each of the four hospitals in the country is in “direct
competition” (in quality) with both one hospital in the same region and one hospital in the other
region, and the regions are in “direct competition” (in prices). Therefore we consider the simplified
localization model in Figure 1, in which the region RA is located above the segment L1L2 and contains
the hospitals H1 and H2, similarly the region RB with hospitals H3 and H4, are located in under the
segment L1L2.
Let us assume that the cost function of each hospital is linear in the quantity and quadratic in the
quality of the produced service and may also include a fixed cost : Ci = cixi +
β
2 q
2
i + Fi where ci and
β are positive parameters. Each hospital receives a price pi (set by the regional regulator) for each
unit of produced service, and a possible lump-sum transfer Ti to break-even, if the operative profit
was negative. Hence, the profit function for hospital i is:
Πi = Ti − Fi + (pi − ci)xDi −
β
2
q2i (5)
3Further economic interpretations of these assumptions are provided by Siciliani et al (2013). We also note that the
existence of a minimum quality standard is not explicitly considered in the present model (see, e.g., Cellini and Lamantia
2016), but parametric restrictions consistent with qH ≥ 0 will be assumed.
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Figure 1: Localized model a` la Salop with two regions and four hospitals.
where xDi is given by (4). To make the model easier, we assume nil fixed cost, and nil public transfer,
i.e., Ti = Fi = 0 for all i ; thus, negative profits are in principle admitted.
In what follows, we assume that constant marginal ci is equal for the hospitals of the same region,
while it differs across regions; this corresponds to the fact that institutional (organizational) aspects
matter on the cost structure. It is well known, as in the Italian or Spanish cases among many others,
that differences in efficiency between hospitals in different regions exist, which result in different
(marginal and average) costs for hospitalization and treatments. Clearly, the assumption of a common
marginal cost for the hospitals belonging to the same region is a simplification that can be removed
in a more general version of the model with differences across providers of the same region. Again,
the fact that parameter β is equal for all hospitals in all regions is a simplifying assumption that can
be removed in a more general model.
3 The game
We propose to analyze the interaction between regulators and hospitals, by resorting to a (very
simple) sequential two-stage game. In the first stage, each regional regulator sets the (DRG) price
for the hospital in its region. In the second stage, each hospital chooses the quality level of its
service; hospitals’ choices about quality are taken simultaneously. Then, patients make their choice,
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to maximise individual utility; the demand functions have already been derived in the previous Section.
Each hospital aims to maximise its profit. The regional regulator aims to maximise a social welfare
function that takes into account the welfare of the inhabitants of the region, the profit of the hospitals
belonging to the region, and attaches an opportunity cost to public spending for health. The sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium can be simply found, solving the model by backward induction.
3.1 Second Stage Game
The Nash equilibrium strategy of the game at the second stage for the hospitals is obtained from the
equation (5):
qi =
pi − ci
βτ
(6)
It is worth noting that the optimal qualities for each hospital only depend on the DRG price of its
own region and on its marginal costs as a consequence of the constant marginal costs hypothesis; in
game theory terms, qualitities are strategic independent (in Section 6 we show that different results
arise in the case of a quadratic cost function in both quality and patients’ number). Not surprisingly,
the equilibrium quality level is increasing in the DRG price: the higher the price, the stronger the
incentive for the hospital of attracting additional patients, and hence the stronger the incentive to
provide higher quality services. Costs of quality and quantity exert a negative effect on the equilibrium
quality. The negative effect of patients’ transportation cost simply tells that higher transportation
costs imply less fierce quality competition among hospitals, that is, higher (local) monopoly power.
3.2 Regional Welfare Functions
In principle, the differences in terms of DRG prices across regions may be motivated by structural
differences across regions (e.g., in populations structure, preferences and even income levels), and by
differences in efficiency between hospitals of different regions (which drive, as already mentioned, to
different costs for hospitalization and treatments), not to mention policy considerations which could
matter when defining the regional social welfare. Here we consider the occurrence of differences across
regions, concerning both the DRG prices (pA and pB) and the costs (cA and cB).
As a result, the quality levels of the hospitals in the same region are the same, and so the patients
located between H1 and H2 will go the the closer hospital (similarly for the patients between H3 and
H4 ): a demand quota of
1
8
is ensured to each hospital.
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Therefore, given the strategies (6), the DRGs fixed by the region (and the cost differences) will
affect competition between hospitals in different regions, in particular H1 and H4 from one side, H2
and H3 from the other (see again Figure 1): the competition occurs between two providers located at
the edges of a Hotelling line of length
1
4
. From Equations (4) and (6) it follows that the patients (that
are
1
4
) located between the hospital i and j, where (i, j) ∈ {(1, 4), (2, 3)}, will move to the hospital i
according to the following quota:
xEi =
1
8
+
∆p−∆c
2βτ2
where ∆p = pi − pj and ∆c = ci − cj .
It is necessary to consider two different cases:
1. if ∆p > ∆c then the patients using hospital in region i are: patients resident in region i which
remain in region i that are xii =
1
8
; patients from the region j moving to region i that are
xji =
∆p−∆c
2βτ2
. Obviously in this case xij = 0;
2. if ∆p < ∆c then patients in region i remaining in the same region are given by xii =
1
8
+
∆p−∆c
2βτ2
and patients moving from region i to j are xij = −
∆p−∆c
2βτ2
. In this case we have xji = 0.
Due to symmetry reasons, the same happens both in the competition between H1 and H4 and in
the competition between H2 and H3.
Given the structure of the model, at the first stage of the game the regions RA and RB fix their own
DRG price in order to maximise a regional social welfare function which takes into account: public
expenditure, with opportunity cost λ > 0; regional hospitals’ profits; the region inhabitants’ welfare.
As a result the social welfare of each region Ri, with i ∈ {A,B}, writes as follows:
Wi = W
I
i + 2W
E
i − βq2i ,
where W Ii is the “internal” welfare, that is the welfare computed in the zone between the two hospitals
of the same region, while WEi is the “external” welfare which is computed in the area between two
hospital in two different regions. In particular we have:
W Ii =
1
4
(−λpi − ci) + 2
∫ 1
8
0
(v + qi − τx) dx.
If ∆p > ∆c then it results:
WEi =
1
8
(−λpi − ci) + (pi − ci)
[
1
8
+
∆p−∆c
2βτ2
]
+
∫ 1
8
0
(v + qi − τx) dx;
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while, if ∆p < ∆c then:
WEi = (−λpi − ci)
[
1
8
+
∆p−∆c
2βτ2
]
− (1 + λ)pj
[
−∆p−∆c
2βτ2
]
+
+
∫ 1
8
+∆p−∆c
2βτ2
0
(v + qi − τx) dx+
∫ 1
8
1
8
+∆p−∆c
2βτ2
(v + qj − τ(1
4
− x)) dx
Let us assume, without loss of generality: cA < cB. Furthermore, let us consider the case:
pA − pB > cA − cB (7)
that is, ∆p > ∆c.
Remark. In this model, in order to assure feasibility of the obtained solutions, that is, assuring
strictly positive quality levels which also constitute a Nash equilibrium for the static first stage game
between the regions and a maximum point in the central Government decision case, we have to make
the following:
Assumption:
1
β
(
λ+ 12
) < τ < 1
βλ
. (8)
Verbally, assume that the parameter capturing the marginal disutility of distance to travel, τ , is:
(i) above a lower-bound, and (ii) below an upper-bound threshold level. Among other implications,
the latter entails that the second order condition of the price-setters’ problems is met; otherwise,
the maximum problem of price-setting would have no finite solution. The former entails positive
quality levels in equilibrium, and optimal price levels above marginal costs; these features -though not
strictly necessary- make the solutions more immediate to understand and comparisons across different
solutions easier. More in general, it makes sense to assume that the travel cost disutility is included in
a limited range. Loosely speaking, if the disutility of travel was “too low”, only service quality would
matter in the consumer choice, and the problem of local regulation would lose significance, along
with the problems linked to patients’ mobility. On the contrary, if the disutility of travel was “too
high”, a world without mobility across regions would emerge, with no interest for the investigation
at hand. A closed range for the parameter capturing the disutility of travel is consistent with the
existence of an economically meaningful equilibrium, with a positive degree of inter-regional mobility
of consumer/patients. This is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by the real world.
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3.3 First stage game: DRG price setting by regional regulators
We now determine the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative first-stage static game between the
regions.
Given the Nash equilibrium strategies of the hospitals, it holds:
W Ii =
1
4
(−λpi − ci) + 1
4
(
v +
pi − ci
βτ
)
− τ
64
for i ∈ {A,B}.
Under the assumption (7), p∗A − p∗B > cA − cB, and in the case of the Region A (RA), we have:
WEA =
1
8
(−λpA − cA) + (pA − cA)
[
(pA − pB)− (cA − cB)
2βτ2
]
+
1
8
(
v +
pA − cA
βτ
)
− τ
128
For the Region B (RB) we obtain:
WEB = (−λpB − cB)
[
1
8
+
(pB − pA)− (cB − cA)
2βτ2
]
− (1 + λ)pA
[
(pA − pB)− (cA − cB)
2βτ2
]
+
+
(
v +
pB − cB
βτ
)[
1
8
+
(pB − pA)− (cB − cA)
2βτ2
]
− τ
2
[
1
8
+
(pB − pA)− (cB − cA)
2βτ2
]2
+
+
(
v +
pA − cA
βτ
− τ
4
)[
(pA − pB)− (cA − cB)
2βτ2
]
+
τ
2
{
1
64
−
[
1
8
+
(pB − pA)− (cB − cA)
2βτ2
]2}
Notice that RA receives a welfare benefit from the fact that patients from RB are served by hospitals
located in RA, as long as p
∗
A > cA. For these “migrant patients” the payment is done from RB to
RA; however, it is reasonable to include the individual welfare of these patients in the social welfare
function of origin region.
After some algebra, we have:
WA = W
I
A + 2W
E
A − βq2A =
16(cA − pA)(2pB − 2cB − τ)− βτ2(16cA + 16λpA + τ − 16v)
32βτ2
WB = W
I
B + 2W
E
B − βq2B =
1
32β2τ3
{−β2τ3[16λpB + τ + 16(cB − v)]+
+16βτ{2cA[λ(pA−pB)+pA− cB]+2λ(pA−pB + cB)(pB−pA)−2p2A+2pApB +(cB−pB)(2pB− τ)}+
+16(cA − pA + pB − cB)2}
Notice that WA is linear in the choice variable pA; thus, the best-reply function pA = pA(pB) is a
degenerate function in which pA is plus (or minus) infinite, according to the fact that the coefficient
of pA in WA is positive (negative). The only finite solution corresponds to the case in which the
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coefficient of pA in WA is nil (which, by the way, correspond to the condition ∂WA/∂pA = 0). From
the first order condition ∂WB/∂pB = 0 a well-behaved best reply function of the regulator of Region
B can be easily derived. It is immediate to verify that the function pB = pB(pA) is positively sloped,
as long as Assumption (8) is met. Thus, the Nash equilibrium can be derived from the system:
−βλτ
2 + 2pB − τ − 2cB
2βτ2
= 0
−β
2λτ3 + βτ [2λcA − 2λ(2pA − 2pB + cB)− 2pA + 4pB − τ − 2cB]− 2(cA − pA + pB − cB)
2β2τ3
= 0
Since it holds that:
∂2WA
∂p2A
= 0,
∂2WB
∂p2B
=
1− 2βτ(λ+ 1)
β2τ3
the first order conditions are also sufficient if:
τ >
1
2β(λ+ 1)
This condition is verified under Assumption (8).
Therefore, in this case, the Nash equilibrium is given by:
p∗A =
β2τ3λ(2λ+ 1)− βτ [2λcA + λ(3τ + 2cB) + τ + 2cB] + 2cA + τ
2[1− βτ(2λ+ 1)] , p
∗
B = cB +
τ
2
(1− λβτ) (9)
In order (p∗A, p
∗
B) to be the Nash equilibrium we have to check that: p
∗
A − p∗B > cA − cB (7). Since
we have assumed cA < cB, this condition is verified if:
τ >
1
β
(
λ+
1
2
)
The last condition is implied by Assumption (8).
Furthermore, under Assumption (8), it holds: p∗A > p
∗
B.
Some comments are in order. First, the cost parameter of hospitals located in RA does not enter
the optimal price of RB, while the opposite is not true. We do not spend several words on this feature,
since it depends on the very simple structure of the problem, and the linearity of the objective function
of the RA’s regulator: the problem of the RA’s regulator has a finite solution only if the DRG price
set by RB is given by the production cost in that region plus a mark-up. Second, in equilibrium,
the optimal DRG price is higher in the region where hospitals are more efficient. Third, DRG price
exceeds marginal cost, in all regions.
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By substituting p∗A and p
∗
B in the Nash equilibrium strategies of the hospitals we obtain the sub-
game perfect solution:
q∗A(p
∗
A) =
β2τ2λ(2λ+ 1) + β[2cA(λ+ 1)− λ(3τ + 2cB)− τ − 2cB] + 1
2β[1− βτ(2λ+ 1)]
q∗B(p
∗
B) =
1− βλτ
2β
It holds that:
q∗A(p
∗
A)− q∗B(p∗B) =
(cB − cA)(λ+ 1)
βτ(2λ+ 1)− 1 > 0
under Assumption (8), since it must hold: τ > 1/
[
β
(
λ+
1
2
)]
. Hence, the larger the difference in
cost efficiency, the larger the difference in quality level, with the more efficient region providing the
higher quality service. Finally, it is worth noting that the condition τ < 1βλ in Assumption (8) assures
positivity of the Nash equilibrium quality levels: q∗A(p
∗
A) > q
∗
B(p
∗
B) > 0.
We can also compute the Nash Equilibrium profits (or, more precisely the operative profits which
disregard fixed cost and possible transfer):
Π∗A =
[1− βτ(λ+ 1)]{β2λτ2(2λ+ 1) + β[2cA(λ+ 1)− λ(3τ + 2cB)− τ − 2cB] + 1}
8β[βτ(2λ+ 1)− 1]
Π∗B =
β3λτ3(λ+ 1)(2λ+ 1) + β2τ [2λcA(λ+ 1)− λ(λ+ 1)(5τ + 2cB)− τ ]− 2β[cA(λ+ 1)− λ(2τ + cB)− τ − cB]− 1
1− 8β[βτ(2λ+ 1)]
Therefore we have:
Π∗A −Π∗B =
βτ(λ+ 1)(cB − cA)
4[βτ(2λ+ 1)− 1] > 0
Finally we notice:
Π∗A ∧ Π∗B > 0 ⇐⇒ θ1 < cB − cA < θ2
where, under Assumption (8):
θ1 =
β2λτ2(2λ+ 1)− βτ(3λ+ 1) + 1
2β(λ+ 1)
< 0 (10)
θ2 =
β2τ2(λ+ 1)(2λ+ 1)− βτ(3λ+ 2) + 1
2β(λ+ 1)
> 0
It is interesting to note that the operative profit of both providers are strictly positive in equilibrium
if the gap in cost efficiency between regions is below a threshold level; on the contrary, in the presence
of a large difference in cost efficiency, negative operative profits are possible to observe in equilibrium
for the less efficient hospital, while the more efficient ones obtain positive profit in any case.4
4To keep our analysis consistent, negative profits of hospital have to be repaid by the Government, without attaching
the opportunity cost λ to such transfer: in this case, transfer from Government to hospital is immaterial to total social
welfare.
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All the above results, obtained in the case ∆p > ∆c, symmetrically hold under the opposite
assumption ∆c > ∆p. In the latter case, patients will move from RA to RB, and the welfare functions
switch between regions. Thus, equilibrium prices will be:
p∗B =
β2τ3λ(2λ+ 1)− βτ [2λcB + λ(3τ + 2cA) + τ + 2cA] + 2cB + τ
2[1− βτ(2λ+ 1)] , p
∗
A = cA +
τ
2
(1− λβτ)
The corresponding Second Order Condition requires τ > 1/[2β(λ + 1)]. Moreover, the condition
∆p < ∆c, joint with cA < cB, requires τ < 1/[β(2λ + 1)]. The latter implies that the condition
ensuring positive quality levels, i.e. τ < 1/(βλ), is met. Hence, the appropriate assumption to make
in the case ∆c > ∆p, replacing Assumption (8), is:
1
2β(λ+ 1)
< τ <
1
β(2λ+ 1)
So, also in this case, the parameter capturing the marginal disutility of distance has to be included in
a interval, to provide an economically meaningful solution, with the coexistence of hospitals in both
regions and patients’ mobility.
4 DRG price setting under a central authority decision
We now determine the price levels that, given the Nash equilibrium strategies of the hospitals, a
central government would fix in order to maximise the aggregated social welfare function, in which we
consider:
qA = q
∗
1(pA) = q
∗
2(pA), qB = q
∗
3(pB) = q
∗
4(pB).
We develop the computations in the benchmark case cA < cB where we observe:
xD1 + x
D
2 =
1
4
+ 2
(
1
8
+
qA − qB
2τ
)
=
1
2
+
qA − qB
τ
.
Analogously:
xD3 + x
D
4 =
1
2
+
qB − qA
τ
Therefore, by considering the same opportunity cost λ of public expenditures, we obtain the
following aggregated social welfare function:
S = (−λpA − cA)
(
1
2
+
qA − qB
τ
)
+ (−λpB − cB)
(
1
2
+
qB − qA
τ
)
− β(q2A + q2B)+
15
+2
∫ 1
8
0
(v + qA − τx)dx+ 2
∫ 1
8
0
(v + qB − τx)dx+
+2
∫ 1
8
+
qA−qB
2τ
0
(v + qA − τx) dx+ 2
∫ 1
4
1
8
+
qA−qB
2τ
(v + qB − τ(1
4
− x))dx
where the terms in the first row represent the hospitals’ profits and the public expenditures, the terms
in the second row are the “internal” welfare of the patients of the two regions and the terms in the
third row constitute their “external” welfare.
By substituting the Nash equilibrium qualities we obtain the First Order Conditions:

∂S
∂pA
= 0 ⇐⇒ β
2λτ3 − βτ [2cA(λ+ 1) + 2λ(2pB − cB) + τ + 2cB] + 2(cA + pB − cB)
2[1− 2βτ(λ+ 1)] = 0
∂S
∂pB
= 0 ⇐⇒ β
2λτ3 − βτ [−2cA(λ− 1) + 2λ(2pA + cB) + τ + 2cB] + 2(cB + pA − cA)
2[1− 2βτ(λ+ 1)] = 0
The solution of this system is given by:
p¯A =
β2λτ3(2λ+ 1)− βτ [2cA(3λ+ 1) + λ(3τ + 2cB) + τ + 2cB] + 4cA + τ
4[1− βτ(2λ+ 1)]
p¯B =
β2λτ3(2λ+ 1)− βτ [2cA(λ+ 1) + 3λ(τ + 2cB) + τ + 2cB] + 4cB + τ
4[1− βτ(2λ+ 1)]
(11)
This solution provides the absolute maximum of S if and only if:
τ >
1
β(2λ+ 1)
(12)
In fact, the Hessian matrix of S is given by:
HS =

1− 2βτ(λ+ 1)
β2τ3
2λβτ − 1
β2τ3
2λβτ − 1
β2τ3
1− 2βτ(λ+ 1)
β2τ3

and it holds:
trHS = 2
1− 2βτ(λ+ 1)
β2τ3
< 0 ⇐⇒ τ > 1
2β(λ+ 1)
detHS > 0 ⇐⇒ τ > 1
β(2λ+ 1)
so the sufficient condition for a maximum implies: τ > max
(
1
2β(λ+ 1)
,
1
β(2λ+ 1)
)
, but since
1
β(2λ+ 1)
>
1
2β(λ+ 1)
, we obtain the condition (12), which is implied by Assumption (8).
It is worth noting that, if this condition is not satisfied, then (p¯A, p¯B) constitutes a saddle point.
The economic meaning is immediate: if the condition is not met, the problem is not concave, and
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the solution is not an internal, finite solution: the optimal DRG prices would be either plus or minus
infinite - which is clearly meaningless from an economic point of view.
Since we are considering cA < cB, if condition (12) holds, we have that:
p¯A > p¯B ⇐⇒ 1
β(2λ+ 1)
< τ <
1
βλ
and this must be verified because of Assumption (8). Thus, even under a central authority setting
the DRG prices in all regions, the optimal price is higher for the regions with more efficient hospitals.
Hence, it is intriguing to observe that the price setting rule suggested by our theoretical model is the
opposite with respect to what we often observe in the real world, where higher DRG prices are in
operation in regions where hospitals are more inefficient.
The corresponding optimal qualities are thus given by:
q∗A(p¯A) =
β2τ2λ(2λ+ 1) + β[2cA(λ+ 1)− λ(3τ + 2cB)− τ − 2cB] + 1
4β[1− βτ(2λ+ 1)]
q∗B(p¯B) =
β2τ2λ(2λ+ 1) + β[−2cA(λ+ 1)− λ(3τ − 2cB)− τ + 2cB] + 1
4β[1− βτ(2λ+ 1)]
and it holds, since we are considering cA < cB and assuming (8):
q∗A(p¯A) > q
∗
B(p¯B)
Thus, even under a central authority setting the DRG prices in all regions, the quality of the
services is higher for the region with the more efficient hospitals, and higher regulated price.
5 Policy implications: a brief comparison among the solutions
A comparison between the equilibrium solution in the case of regionally decentralised regulation and
the national regulation can be easily made. Table 1 reports price and quality levels in equilibrium
under the two regimes.
Table 1. Price and quality under different institutional rules
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Price - Regional Regulation
p∗A=
β2τ3λ(2λ+ 1)− βτ [2λcA + λ(3τ + 2cB) + τ + 2cB] + 2cA + τ
2[1− βτ(2λ+ 1)]
p∗B= cB+
τ
2
(1− λβτ)
Price - National Regulation
p¯A=
β2λτ3(2λ+ 1)− βτ [2cA(3λ+ 1) + λ(3τ + 2cB) + τ + 2cB] + 4cA + τ
4[1− βτ(2λ+ 1)]
p¯B=
β2λτ3(2λ+ 1)− βτ [2cA(λ+ 1) + 3λ(τ + 2cB) + τ + 2cB] + 4cB + τ
4[1− βτ(2λ+ 1)]
Quality - Regional Regulation
q∗A(p
∗
A) =
β2τ2λ(2λ+ 1) + β[2cA(λ+ 1)− λ(3τ + 2cB)− τ − 2cB] + 1
2β[1− βτ(2λ+ 1)]
q∗B(p
∗
B) =
1− βλτ
2β
Quality - National Regulation
q∗A(p¯A) =
β2τ2λ(2λ+ 1) + β[2cA(λ+ 1)− λ(3τ + 2cB)− τ − 2cB] + 1
4β[1− βτ(2λ+ 1)]
q∗B(p¯B) =
β2τ2λ(2λ+ 1) + β[−2cA(λ+ 1)− λ(3τ − 2cB)− τ + 2cB] + 1
4β[1− βτ(2λ+ 1)]
It holds p¯A < p
∗
A and p¯B < p
∗
B. In fact we have:
cB − cA > θ1 (13)
with θ1 < 0 given by (10). It is also easy to see that: q
∗
A(p¯A) =
1
2q
∗
A(p
∗
A) and q
∗
B(p¯B) < q
∗
B(p
∗
B) (since
the opposite would hold if and only if the previous inequality (13) does not hold). It is interesting to
notice that the inter-regional mobility –and, as a consequence, the hospitals demand levels– coincide
under both decision regimes (the regional decentralised regulation and the central national authority),
since we get the same ∆p value:
∆p =
(1− βλτ)(cB − cA)
βτ(2λ+ 1)− 1
Thus, the following conclusions emerge from this simple model. (1) Regionally decentralised price
regulation leads to higher price levels. (2) This entails higher quality levels of the produced services,
under regionally decentralised price regulation. (3) The degree of inter-regional consumers’ mobility
does not change between the regimes of regional vs. national price regulation. (4) Hence, regional
decentralisation entails higher consumer welfare, in front of the same degree of inter-regional mobility
and higher quality levels. (5) No clear-cut analytical conclusions can be reached concerning the
providers’ operative profits: indeed, price (and hence revenue) levels are higher under the regional
regulation, but quality levels are also larger, entailing larger costs; thus, operative profit may be
larger or smaller, depending on parameter configuration. (6) Under both the regional decentralized
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regime and the central national authority, the lower the providers’ marginal cost of production, the
higher the optimal regulated price. (7) The differential between regulated price levels across regions
is proportional to the differential in marginal costs.
Surely, strategic interdependence among regional price regulators is a source of allocative ineffi-
ciency, but at the same time this characteristic is beneficial to consumers/patients. It is also worth
underlining, as already noted by Miraldo et al (2011), that, in contexts like this, price has two effects,
or plays a double role: the first is the usual one in terms of attaining allocative efficiency; the second
is in terms of rent extraction.
6 Extensions
The present article flows in a literature where similar –and even more detailed and extended– models
are already available. Our present analysis contributes in highlighting the sequential structure of
decision chain, where policy-makers set price in a previous stage and then profit-oriented providers take
their decisions on quality, which in turn determines the patients’ choice. The model can be extended
along different routes. As already mentioned, we could consider the possibility that the health care
providers within any region are different as far as their nature and cost parameter is concerned (see,
e.g., Weber, 2014). In such a case, one can investigate the model under the assumption that the local
regulator has to fix one price, or differentiated prices across providers are possible.
A different line of development can concern the size of regions: following the seminal paper of
Kanbur and Keen (1993),one could assume that the mass of people populating the regions is different.
In such a circumstance, one can consider the case that the more populated region is the one with the
hospital with higher or lower cost efficiency. In this case, the problem of endogeneous spatial location
of providers does make sense (see, e.g., Gravelle et al., 2016) and the location choice can be made by
providers themselves, or by regional regulators.
Again, a further asymmetry between regions can be introduced as far as the opportunity cost of
public spending for health is concerned: parameter λ may differ across regions, representing different
political views between local authorities.
For future research, it could also be interesting to consider the coexistence of differentiated regional
DRG prices for regional residents, joint with an unique DRG price, fixed by a national authority, for
extra-regional treatments; this configuration is the closest to the current situation in countries like
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Italy.5 Finally, in the introduced framework of regional DRG price setting, also a differential game
approach, as in Brekke et al. (2010, 2012), Cellini et al. (2015) and Siciliani et al. (2013), can
be a fruitful research direction, since it makes possible to study in a dynamic context the hospital
investments and to introduce some realistic features, such as a sluggish demand or sticky prices.
In this Section we limit to sketch how the outcome of the second stage of our basic model changes,
by assuming a cost function which is quadratic not only in the quality levels, but also in the produced
quantity. Clearly, the linear vs. convex form of the cost function (that is, the assumption of constant
vs. increasing marginal cost) corresponds to different features concerning the pattern of productivity
and diseconomies of scale.6
Under the assumption of increasing marginal cost, and specifically the quadratic cost function, the
profit function for hospital i (still apart from fixed cost and lump-sum transfer) is given by:
Πi = pix
D
i − ci[xDi ]2 −
β
2
q2i (14)
where:
xDi =
1
4
+
qi − qi+1
2τ
+
qi − qi−1
2τ
The First Order Condition for the profit function maximization with respect to the choice variable qi
leads to:
qi =
2τpi + ci[2(qi−1 + qi+1)− τ ]
2(βτ2 + 2ci)
Without loss of generality, we assume that, for the considered hospital i, the hospital i− 1 belongs to
his region, while the hospital i + 1 belongs to the other region. Then, due to the symmetry between
the regions, we impose: qi = qi−1. This lets us to obtain the optimal response function of the hospital
i to the quality set by the hospitals belonging to the opponent region:
qi(qj) =
τpi + ci(qj − τ2 )
βτ2 + ci
with i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j. Finally, by solving this algebraic 2-equations system, we get the Nash
Equilibrium of the second-stage game:
q∗A(pA, pB) =
2[cA(pB − cB) + pAcB]− βτ2(cA − 2pA)
2βτ(βτ2 + cA + cB)
5Brekke et al. (2014) specifically investigates the effects of different regimes in the extra-regional treatment prices.
6A large body of theoretical and empirical literature is available concerning the linear vs. convex cost function for
production by hospitals. A convex function captures the presence of excess demand and/or capacity constraint. See,
e.g., the review in Folland et al. (2004); see also Brekke et al. (2010) where constant or increasing marginal costs are
associated to equilibria with strongly different properties.
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q∗B(pA, pB) =
2[cA(pB − cB) + pAcB]− βτ2(cB − 2pB)
2βτ(βτ2 + cA + cB)
Therefore, the quadratic structure of the costs leads to Nash Equilibrium strategies for all the hospitals
which depend on the DRG prices chosen by both regions.
It is easy to check that:
q∗A(pA, pB)− q∗B(pA, pB) =
τ [2(pA − pB) + cB − cA]
2(βτ2 + cA + cB)
Hence we get:
q∗A(pA, pB) > q
∗
B(pA, pB) ⇐⇒ pA − pB >
cA − cB
2
And finally we note:
xDA = x
D
1 + x
D
2 =
1
2
+
2(pA − pB) + cB − cA
2(βτ2 + cA + cB)
xDB = x
D
3 + x
D
4 =
1
2
− 2(pA − pB) + cB − cA
2(βτ2 + cA + cB)
Straightforward implications and comparisons with the case of constant marginal cost are left to
the readers.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have proposed a modification of the spatial competition model a` la Salop, able to
distinguish between intra- and inter- regional competition. Our model is particularly appropriate to
study markets in which producers (or, more generally, service providers) compete in quality, and prices
are regulated by local public authorities. In such a framework, interdependence links do exist not only
among providers and between providers and authorities, but also among authorities. The healthcare
markets, and specifically the market for hospital services is the most clear empirical counterpart for
our theoretical model. However, the theoretical model can be easily applied to other sectors, like
school and eduction, or long-term care, where competition is typically based on quality, and prices are
regulated -usually by local or regional authorities.
The interdependence among regional regulators as price setters is the key contribution of the
present article to the theoretical literature dealing with service provision with quality competition
under regulated prices. We have specifically thought of the healthcare markets, where the interactions
between local authorities, and their consequences, are well documented by empirical investigations,
but are overlooked by theoretical models which mainly focus on quality decisions.
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We are aware that alternative models with spatial competition in healthcare markets exist, some-
times more detailed than this present variant. Admittedly, our model is very simple and conclusions
may be sensitive to specific simplifying assummptions. Nevertheless, the present model has relevant
elements of realism, and it can be a useful starting point for policy analysis and the investigation about
the effects of different institutional designs in the presence of links of strategic interdependence in the
stage of price design. We have underlined that the interdependence among regional price regulators
is an important aspect overlooked by available literature, but deserving theoretical attention. In the
simple framework at hand we have shown that some (possibly counterintuitive) conclusions emerge.
For instance, higher regulated prices associate, in equilibrium, with more efficient providers; however,
this also joins with higher quality levels of the provided service. From a policy perspective, our model
suggests that national price regulation drives to lower regulated price levels, and hence to smaller
public expenditure. However, this fact is detrimental to the consumers/patients’ welfare, since the
fierceness of (inter-regional) competition is more limited. So, in other words, the well-known static
trade-off between sound public finance and citizens’ welfare emerges, here with respect to costs and
benefit of decentralisation: decentralised regulation is detrimental to public finance but beneficial to
consumers.
References
[1] Aiura H (2016), The effect of cross-border healthcare on quality, public health insurance, and in-
come redistribution, Institute for Sammfunsokonomi Working Paper 4/2016 (SSRN wp 2766847).
[2] Balia S, Brau R, Marroccu E (2014), What drives patient mobility across Italian regions? Evidence
from hospital discharge data, Development in Health Economics and Public Policitcs 12: 133-54.
[3] Bech M, Christiansen T, Dunham K, Lauridsen J, Lyttkens CH, McDonald K, et al. (2009), The
influence of economic incentives and regulatory factors on the adoption of treatment technologies:
a case study of technologies used to treat heart attacks, Health Economics 18: 1114-32.
[4] Bokhari F (2009), Managed care competition and the adoption of hospital technology: the case of
cardiac catherization, International Journal of Industrial Organization 27: 223-37.
[5] Brekke K, Cellini R, Siciliani L, Straume O R (2010), Competition and quality in health care
markets: A differential game approach , Journal of Health Economics, 29: 508-523.
22
[6] Brekke K, Siciliani L, Straume O R (2011), Hospital competition and quality with regulated prices,
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 113: 444-469.
[7] Brekke K, Cellini R, Siciliani L, Straume O R (2012), Competition in regulated markets with
sluggish beliefs about quality, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 21: 131-178.
[8] Brekke K, Levaggi R, Siciliani L, Straume O R (2014), Patient mobility, healthcare quality and
welfare, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 105: 140-57.
[9] Brekke K, Levaggi R, Siciliani L, Straume O R (2016), Patient mobility and health care quality
when regions and patients differ in income, Journal of Health Economics, 50: 372–87.
[10] Busse R, Geissler A, Quentin W, Wiley M (Eds.) (2001), Diagnosis-related groups in Europe:
moving towards transparency, efficiency and quality in hospitals, European Observatory on Health
System and Policies Series. Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press - McGraw Hill.
[11] Cantu` E, Carbone C, Anessi Pessina E (2001), Do Italian regions effectively use DRG funding
to steer provider behavior?, in: Ongaro E, Massey A,Holzer M, Wayenberg E (Eds.). Policy,
performance and management in governance and intergovernmental relations: transatlantic per-
spectives. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 341-59.
[12] Cavalieri M, Gitto L, Guccio C (2013), Reimbursement systems and quality of hospital care: An
empirical analysis for Italy, Health Policy 111: 273-89
[13] Cavalieri M, Guccio C, Lisi D, Pignataro G (2016), Does the extent of per case payment sys-
tem affect hospital efficiency? Evidence from the Italian NHS, Public Finance Review, DOI:
10.1177/1091142116651487.
[14] Cellini R, Lamantia F (2016), Quality competition in markets with regulated prices and minimum
quality standards, Journal of Evolutionary Economics 25: 345-70.
[15] Cellini R, Siciliani L, Straume O R (2015), A dynamic model of quality competition with endoge-
nous prices, NIPE, Universidade do Minho.
[16] Culyer A J, Newhouse J P (Eds) (2000), Handbook of health economics. Volume 1, Part A,
Amsterdam: Elsevier.
23
[17] Ellis R P, McGuire T (1986), Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement: Cost sharing
and supply, Journal of Health Economics, 5: 129-51.
[18] Ellis R P, Miller M (2008), Provider payment methods and incentives, in Heggenhougen K (Ed.)
International Encyclopedia of Public Health. San Diego, CA: Academic Press - Elsevier, p. 395-
402.
[19] Finocchiaro Castro M, Guccio C, Pignataro G, Rizzo I (2014), The effects of reimbursement
mechanisms on medical technology diffusion in the hospital sector in the Italian NHS, Health
Policy 115: 215-29.
[20] Folland S, Goodman A C, Stano M (2004), The economics of health and health care. Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
[21] Gravelle H, Scott A, Sivey P, Yong J, 2016. Competition, price and quality in the market for
physician consultations, Journal of Industrial Economics 64: 135-69.
[22] Hamoudi H, Risueno M (2012), The effect of zoning in spatial competition, Journal of Regional
Sciences 52: 361-74.
[23] Kanbur R, Keen M (1993), Jeux sans frontie`res: tax competition and tax coordination when
countries differ in size, American Economic Review 83: 877-92.
[24] Ishida J, Matsushima N (2004), A Noncooperative Analysis of a Circular City Model Regional
Science and Urban Economics 34: 575-589.
[25] Levaggi R, Moretto M, Pertile P (2012), Static and dynamic efficiency of irreversible health care
investments under alternative payment rules, Journal of Health Economics 31: 169-79.
[26] Levaggi R, Moretto M, Pertile P (2014), Two-part payments for the reimbursement of investments
in health technologies, Health Policy 115: 230-36.
[27] Ma A, Burgess J (1993), Quality competition, welfare, and regulation, Journal of Economics 58:
153-73.
[28] Ma A (1994) Health care payment systems: Cost and quality incentives, Journal of Economics
and Managehcare facilities, ment Strategy 3: 93-112.
24
[29] Mikkala H, Keskimaki I, Hakkinene U (2002), DRG related prices applied in a public health care
system: Can Finland learn form Norway and Sweden? Health Policy 59: 37-51.
[30] Miraldo, M., Siciliani, L., Street, A., 2011. Price adjustment in the hospital sector, Journal of
Health Economics 30: 112–125.
[31] Moreno Serra R, Wagstaff A (2010), System-wide impacts of hospital payment reforms: evidence
from Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Journal of Health Economics 29: 585-602.
[32] Pauli M, McGuire T, Barros P (2011), Handbook of health economics. Volume 2 . Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
[33] Romeo A A, Wagner J L, Lee R H (1984), Prospective reimbursement and the diffusion of new
technologies in hospitals, Journal of Health Economics 3: 1-24.
[34] Rosenmoller M, McKee M, Baeten R (Eds) (2004), Patient mobility in the European Union:
Learning from experience, Bruxelles: The European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies.
http://www.euro.who.int/data/assets/pdf file/0011/120332/E88697.pdf
[35] Salop S C (1979), Monopolistic competition with outside goods, Bell Journal of Economics 10:
141-56.
[36] Schreyoegg J, Stargardt T, Tiemann O, Busse R (2006), Methods to determine reimbursement
rate for DRG: A comparison of nine European countries, Healthcare Management 9: 215-23.
[37] Siciliani L, Straume O R, Cellini R (2013), Quality competition with motivated providers and
sluggish demand, Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37: 2041-61.
[38] Street A, O’Reilly J, Ward P, Mason A (2011), DRG based hospital payment and efficiency:
Theory, evidence and challenges, in Busse R, Geissler A, Quentin W, Wiley M (Eds.) Diagno-
sis related groups in Europe: Moving towards transparency, efficiency and quality in hospitals.
Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press, p. 93-114.
[39] Weber E, 2014. Measuring welfare from ambulatory surgery centers: A spatial analysis of demand
for health care facilities, Journal of Industrial Economics 62: 591-631.
25
